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Could the Laws of Nature Change?*
Marc Lange†‡
After reviewing several failed arguments that laws cannot change, I use the laws’ special
relation to counterfactuals to show how temporary laws would have to differ from
eternal but time-dependent laws. Then I argue that temporary laws are impossible and
that neither Lewis’s nor Armstrong’s analyses of law nicely accounts for the laws’
immutability.
1. Introduction. The natural laws are traditionally characterized as ‘eter-
nal’, ‘fixed’, and ‘immutable’.1 Is the laws’ unchanging character a meta-
physical necessity? If so, then in any possible world, there are exactly the
same laws at all times (though presumably there are different laws in
different possible worlds).2 That there actually are exactly the same laws
at all times is then a consequence of what it is for a truth to be a law of
nature. On the other hand, if the laws’ unchanging character is not a
metaphysical necessity, then even if in fact there have always been and
will always be exactly the same laws, this fact is metaphysically contingent.
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1. In the span of a single sentence, Spinoza (1951, 83) applied all three of these ad-
jectives to the laws. Descartes (2000, 28–29) addressed the laws’ fixity in a letter to
Mersenne (April 15, 1630):
[I]t is God who has established the laws of nature, as a King establishes laws in
his kingdom. . . . You will be told that if God has established these truths, he
could also change them as a King changes his laws. To which it must be replied:
yes, if his will can change. But I understand them as eternal and immutable. And
I judge the same of God.
2. It is standard to unpack ‘p is metaphysically necessary’ as ‘p is true in all possible
worlds’ (see, e.g., Sider 2003, 186), though of course, there are many different views
regarding the ontology of possible worlds and the proper interpretation of possible-
worlds talk.
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To ask whether the laws of nature could change is not to ask whether
a given fact m, which is actually a law of nature, could instead have been
an accident. Rather, my question is whether it follows with metaphysical
necessity, from the fact that m is now a law, that m always was and always
will be a law. One way to judge among various proposed philosophical
analyses of natural law is first to figure out whether or not the laws must
be immutable and then to examine how well each proposed analysis ex-
plains why this is so. This is the project I try to pursue in this paper.
Occasionally, one encounters articles with provocative titles such as
“Anything Can Change, Even an Immutable Law of Nature” (New York
Times, August 15, 2001) and “Are the Laws of Nature Changing with
Time?” (Physics World, April 2003). These articles generally concern
whether certain physical parameters heretofore believed constant may in
fact be slowly changing. Despite the sensationalistic titles of these articles,
such changes need not threaten the laws’ immutability. The laws at every
moment may still be the same—identifying the same function of time (or
of some other factor) as giving the physical parameter’s value at every
moment.
Likewise, in articles about cosmology or elementary particle physics, one
sometimes reads that as the universe cooled after the Big Bang, symmetries
were spontaneously broken, ‘phase transitions’ took place, and discon-
tinuous changes occurred in the values of various physical parameters
(e.g., in the strength of certain fundamental interactions, or in the masses
of certain species of particle). These changes are sometimes described as
involving changes in the laws of nature. Here is a typical remark:
One usually assumes that the current laws of physics did not apply
[in the period immediately following the Big Bang]. They took hold
only after the density of the universe dropped below the so-called
Planck density, which equals 1094 grams per cubic centimeter. . . .
[T]he same theory may have different ‘vacuum states’, corresponding
to different types of symmetry breaking between fundamental inter-
actions and, as a result, to different laws of low-energy physics. (Linde
1994, 48, 55)
However, perhaps this ‘change’ in the laws of nature as the universe cooled
and expanded is better understood as involving unchanging laws such as
(to give a very simple example)
(1) Between any two electrons that have been at rest, separated by r
centimeters, for at least r/c seconds, there is an electrostatic repulsion
of F dynes, if the universe is no more than 1010 seconds old, and
f dynes ( ) otherwise.f ( F
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Instead of citing the universe’s age, the law might instead specify the
critical factor as the universe’s being cooler than degrees Kelvin,153 # 10
for example (Weinberg 1977, 143). In that case, (1)—citing the universe’s
age—would be an accidental truth, not a law. Presumably, the electrostatic
forces between electrons before and after the temperature threshold is
crossed would then be explained by laws that do not merely specify the
strengths of these particular forces in the manner of (1). Rather, laws more
fundamental than any resembling (1) would explain why K is153 # 10
the critical temperature (for many kinds of interactions, not just for the
mutual electrostatic repulsion of two electrons) and by what process there
arises new behavior as a result of the universe’s crossing this temperature
threshold. If the ‘phase transition’ is properly understood in this fashion,
then it does not involve a change in the laws of nature.
On the other hand, perhaps the ‘phase transition’ is properly understood
differently, as involving
(2) Between any two electrons that have been at rest, separated by r
centimeters, for at least r/c seconds, there is an electrostatic repulsion
of F dynes,
holding as a law during the period before the universe is more than
seconds old, and1010
(3) Between any two electrons that have been at rest, separated by r
centimeters, for at least r/c seconds, there is an electrostatic repulsion
of f dynes,
holding as a law thereafter ( ). In that case, the ‘phase transition’f ( F
really does involve a change in the laws. Once again, I have chosen a
simple example. More realistically, the laws before the universe is 1010
seconds old would include (2) as a consequence of some broader law,
covering more than just the mutual electrostatic repulsion between long
stationary electrons, and likewise for the new laws after the ‘phase
transition’.
We will have to explore how (1)’s being a law at all times (an eternal
but time-dependent law) would differ from (2)’s and (3)’s each being laws
at different times (temporary laws). If there is no difference, then the laws’
immutability is a trivial matter. Having better understood the difference
between these options, we will be better positioned to see which option
(if either) is the proper interpretation of the posited ‘phase transition’.
Of course, it is undeniable that our beliefs about the laws can change
(and, accordingly, that we can change what we call ‘laws’). But the pos-
sibility of these changes fails to show that the laws themselves can change,
unless the laws at a given time are just those truths that at that time are
widely respected as able to play certain special roles in scientific reasoning
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(perhaps in connection with counterfactual conditionals and scientific ex-
planations). I shall presume that a truth’s character as a law or an accident
is not a reflection of whether or not scientists treat it as a law. In this
respect, I accord with most of the accounts of natural law on the market
today, however much they may disagree on what laws of nature are,
including Lewis’s (1973, 1986, 1999) best-system account, Armstrong’s
(1983, 1997) contingent-relations-among-universals account, and Ellis’s
(2001) essentialist account. I presume that a given truth’s lawhood is a
mind-independent feature of the world and that science aims to ascertain
which truths are laws and which are not. I thus set aside views according
to which we somehow (either individually or as a community of inquirers)
‘project’ lawhood onto certain facts in calling them laws and using them
to play certain roles in science (Goodman 1983, 21), as well as views
according to which the concept of a natural law is not useful for recon-
structing scientific reasoning (van Fraassen 1989; Giere 1995) and views
according to which the laws are not a select proper subset of the truths
(Cartwright 1983; Swartz 1985).
It is sometimes held that there are laws of special sciences and that
these laws were not laws until after their special subject-matter arose. For
example, “The idea that Ohm’s law has a timeless, transcendent existence,
and has been ‘out there’, lying in wait, for aeons until somebody built an
electric circuit is surely ludicrous” (Davies 1995, 258). An analogous ar-
gument might be made regarding any putative law of biology, law of
automobile repair, law of Earth science, and so forth. I shall steer clear
of this (dubious) argument by confining my attention to whether the
fundamental laws of physics can change.
Some physicists have recently suggested that as the universe expanded
and cooled, new fundamental forces, particles, and the laws governing
them came into being:
In a more serious vein, one could ask whether the laws of physics
are intimately bound up with the evolution of the universe, influenced
not only by the initial conditions, but also by the subsequent evo-
lutionary processes themselves. . . . Is it at all possible that the gen-
erations of quarks and leptons have ‘evolved’ one after another in
some sense, that each generation is ‘born’, so to speak, at the cor-
responding energy (or length) scale of an expanding universe, its
properties being influenced, but not necessarily deterministically
fixed, by what already exists? . . . So what I should mean would be
that the constants like mass [e.g., the mass of each top quark, the mass
of each W meson] are really dynamical quantities that were selected,
with some degree of chanciness, from among other possibilities in the
course of the universal evolution. (Nambu 1985, 108–109)
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The hierarchy of laws has evolved together with the evolution of the
universe. The newly created laws did not exist at the beginning as laws
but only as possibilities. (Thirring 1995, 132; cf. Stöltzner 1995, 50)
Of course, it is notoriously presumptuous for a philosopher to rule out
some scientific theory that is “being discussed in respectable scientific fora”
(as Schweber 1997, 173 says is the case of the notion that “laws of nature
mutate”)—to declare that the theory’s truth is metaphysically impossible!
On the other hand, perhaps talk of ‘newly created laws’ is a bad meta-
physical gloss on a perfectly respectable scientific theory. I shall argue
that this is the case.
In Section 2, I explain several reasons why Poincaré’s argument for the
laws’ immutability fails. In Section 3, I argue that the laws’ truth fails to
ensure the laws’ immutability, considering that laws may be uninstantiated
and that a ‘temporary law’ should be required to govern only a certain
period of time. In Section 4, I elaborate how laws differ from accidents
in their relation to counterfactuals. I use this result in Section 5 to explain
how temporary laws would differ from eternal but time-dependent laws.
This leads to an argument that the laws cannot change—an argument
that avoids the problems encountered by the arguments against temporary
laws in Sections 2 and 3. Finally, in Section 6, I argue that neither Lewis’s
best-system account of laws nor Armstrong’s contingent-relations-among-
universals account nicely explains the laws’ immutability. Rather, the laws’
immutability must be written into these accounts ‘by hand’. An important
criterion of adequacy for any proposed metaphysical analysis of natural
law should be to explain why temporary laws are impossible.
2. Poincaré’s Argument for the Laws’ Immutability. Nineteenth-century
enthusiasm for evolution led some natural philosophers to take seriously
the possibility that the laws can change over time. (As we have just seen,
the same biological metaphors are still being invoked.) Responding to
these proposals, Poincaré (1963) insisted that the laws cannot change.
Rather, the laws entail that different regularities hold under different
nomically possible conditions, and a change in those conditions should
not be mistaken for a change in the laws themselves. What has changed
instead “are nothing but resultants” (1963, 12) of the laws and accidental
conditions; the genuine laws “remain intact” (1963, 13). Poincaré’s ar-
gument for this view seems to be that any change in the putative laws
must happen for some reason, and that reason must involve principles
that remain unchanged in the transition, namely, the genuine laws. They
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remain intact “since it will be through these principles that the changes
will be made” (1963, 13).3
The ‘phase transitions’ posited as occurring early in the universe’s his-
tory may perhaps be understood along the lines suggested by Poincaré.
The current ‘laws of low-energy physics’ result from the fundamental laws
together with an accidental condition prevailing in our cosmic epoch: the
state of the Higgs field (or of several different fields). The current ‘laws
of low-energy physics’ were violated in the early universe because different
accidental conditions prevailed then. Likewise, if the state of the Higgs
field underwent some transition at 1010 seconds after the Big Bang, then
the laws governing that transition (e.g., specifying the chance in those
conditions of the Higgs field’s changing to the state that has since pre-
vailed) are genuine laws, along with laws specifying how particle inter-
actions depends on the state of the Higgs field—and none of them has
changed.
However, Poincaré’s general argument (as I understand it) fails to show
that the laws cannot change. First, the argument presupposes that any
alleged change in the laws must happen for some reason. But the fun-
damental laws are often taken to be brute facts (i.e., facts that could have
been otherwise, but there is no reason why they are not otherwise). That
scientific explanations come to an end with the fundamental laws is what
makes them fundamental, after all. Just as the fundamental laws have no
explanations, so a change in the fundamental laws would presumably
have no explanation. It would simply be a brute fact that (2) is a law
during one span of time and (3) is a law during another.
Second, even if Poincaré is correct in assuming that any alleged change
in the laws must happen for some reason, why must the change be gov-
erned by a principle that remains unchanged in the transition? Consider
an analogy. The Constitution codifies the fundamental laws of the United
States. In Article Five, the Constitution specifies the procedures for its
own amendment. An amendment could even amend Article Five. The
ratification of such an amendment would then be governed by Article
Five, yet Article Five would not remain unchanged in the transition.
Likewise, a change in the natural laws could happen for a reason (i.e.,
3. Admittedly, Poincaré regarded the laws discovered by science as not wholly mind-
independent features of the world. But although Poincaré’s view of laws thus falls
outside of the range of views I am addressing (see Section 1), his argument for the
immutability of the laws discovered by science (the only sort of laws for which he
thinks it meaningful to ask whether they vary with time) does not turn on any of his
neo-Kantian views. Indeed, Poincaré’s argument seems to me very similar to the ar-
gument for the laws’ immutability given by Shoemaker (1998, 75, n. 8).
LAWS OF NATURE 75
could be governed by the natural laws then in force) and yet the natural
laws governing the change could still change along with the other laws.
Third, even if Poincaré is correct in assuming that any alleged change
in a law must be governed by a principle that remains unchanged in the
transition, this constraint imposes no obstacle to that principle itself
changing at some other time, in accordance with some other principle
that remains unchanged in that transition, and so forth infinitely far
downward. None of these principles would then be immutable even if, as
it happened, some of them never changed. Here I leave Poincaré’s
argument.
3. Are the Laws Immutable Just by Virtue of Being Truths? Suppose for
the sake of reductio that (2) is a law for some span of time and (3) is a
law thereafter. (This change in the laws may be brute or governed by
some other principle; it makes no difference to the following argument.)
Suppose that sometime during the latter period, there are two electrons
that have been at rest, separated by r centimeters, for at least r/c seconds.
Then, to accord with (3), these electrons must experience a mutual elec-
trostatic repulsion of f dynes. But this occurrence violates (2). Since (2)
is false, (2) is not a law. (Neither is [3], by an analogous argument con-
cerning two electrons during the period when [2] is a law.) Reductio com-
pleted: the laws of nature cannot change.
This reductio presupposes that if it is ever a law that m, then m is true.
That is certainly the traditional view: the contingent truths investigated
by science consist of the laws and the accidents, and the “problem of law”
(Goodman 1983, 17) is to identify the ground of this distinction. That is,
according to the received view, lawhood equals truth plus lawlikeness,
and the problem of law is to understand what makes a truth ‘lawlike’.
The above reductio aims to show that for the laws to change from (2) to
(3), (2) would have to be false and so would (3). Hence, (2) would never
be a law, and neither would (3), and so the genuine laws cannot change.
There are two points at which this argument should be resisted. The
first objection notes that (2) can cease to be a law, and (3) can hencefor-
ward be a law, without violating the requirement that laws be truths—as
long as (2) and (3) are both uninstantiated. All serious accounts of natural
law recognize that there can be (and presumably are) plenty of uninstan-
tiated laws.4 If it is an accidental fact that no two electrons are ever at
4. Strictly speaking, Armstrong’s account leaves no room for uninstantiated laws (since
a universal, according to Armstrong, must be instantiated in order to exist). But Arm-
strong’s account does allow for functional laws with uninstantiated values of the de-
terminables. It construes functional laws as relations among second order universals,
such as the property of being an electric charge property, where this second order
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rest exactly r centimeters apart for r/c seconds, then (2) and (3) are both
true. So during the period when (2) is a law, (3) must be an accident, and
vice versa. Hence the above reductio fails to rule out all changes in the
laws: it fails to rule out vacuous truths swapping lawlikeness for nonlaw-
likeness and vice versa. (Of course, fans of changing laws have something
more dramatic in mind than changes confined to vacuous truths. But that
this argument fails to apply to vacuous truths highlights the fact that it
appeals to nothing about the laws beyond their truth. One might have
expected the laws’ immutability to derive somehow from whatever it is
that makes them laws over and above their truth.)
The second objection accuses the reductio of begging the question
against the laws’ mutability by taking for granted that if m is ever a law,
then m is true. The requirement that laws be truths is itself motivated by
the presupposition that the laws cannot change. To remain open-minded
about whether there can be different laws during different periods, we
should demand only that if m is a law throughout some period, then the
events occurring in that period accord with m—i.e., that, loosely speaking,
m be true ‘of the period’ that m governs, though perhaps not true sim-
pliciter (i.e., not ‘true of the universe’s entire history’). Of course, for m
to be a law during some period, it is not enough that m be true ‘of that
period’; this condition fails to distinguish the period’s laws from its ac-
cidents. But our present concern is limited to the ‘truth’ requirement; the
reductio did not aim to exploit m’s lawlikeness, but only its truth.
To put matters a bit more precisely: m is true ‘of a given period’ exactly
when the universe’s history during that period is logically consistent with
m’s truth. Under the revised ‘truth’ requirement (namely, that m is a law
in a given period only if m is true of that period), (2) can cease to be a
law, and (3) can henceforward be a law, even if during each period, there
are electrons at rest separated by exactly r centimeters for at least r/c
seconds.
4. How Do Laws Differ from Accidents? Suppose that (2) is true ‘of the
earlier period’ in the universe’s history, and that (3) is true ‘of the later
period’. What makes (2) a law in the former period and (3) a law in the
latter? Here we must turn from considering the laws’ truth to considering
their ‘lawlikeness’.
One of the traditional differences between laws and accidents is that
laws govern not only what does happen, but also what would have hap-
pened under various unrealized circumstances. In other words, laws stand
universal is instantiated even if certain values of electric charge are not (Armstrong
1983, 113). So Armstrong’s account would presumably allow for laws like (2) and (3)
to be uninstantiated.
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in an especially intimate relation to counterfactuals. Even if no two elec-
trons actually find themselves having been at rest for at least r/c seconds,
exactly r centimeters apart, during the period when (2) is a law, (2) is not
idle. It specifies what would have happened then, had there been two such
electrons: they would have experienced a mutual electrostatic repulsion
of F dynes. The truth of
(4) Had two electrons been at rest and exactly r centimeters apart for
at least r/c seconds at some moment when the universe is no more
than 1010 seconds old, then any such electrons would have expe-
rienced at that moment a mutual electrostatic repulsion of F dynes
does not contradict the truth of
(5) Had two electrons been at rest and exactly r centimeters apart for
at least r/c seconds at some moment when the universe is more than
1010 seconds old, then any such electrons would have experienced
at that moment a mutual electrostatic repulsion of f dynes,
which (3)’s lawhood during the later period requires, just as there is no
contradiction in both
Had an electron been 5 centimeters from point P at time t, then it
would at that moment have experienced an electrostatic force of F
dynes
and
Had an electron been 10 centimeters from point P at time t, then it
would at that moment have experienced an electrostatic force of f
dynes
( ) being true.f ( F
Let us look more closely at the difference between laws and accidents
in their relation to counterfactuals. Intuitively, once the laws of nature
are fixed, there are various ‘knobs’ for setting the universe’s initial con-
ditions (or any system’s boundary conditions), and these knobs can be
turned (hypothetically!) in any fashion that is logically consistent with
every m where it is a law that m. No matter to what setting the knobs
are turned (counterfactually), within these generous limits, the actual laws
would still have held.5 One entertaining example of knob-turning takes
5. This intuitive picture is rejected by Lewis, for example (for discussion, see Lange
2000), and requires careful elaboration. The electron is stable, but had there been a
less massive lepton possessing one unit of negative electric charge, then perhaps the
electron would have been unstable (since there would have been a particle into which
it could decay while conserving electric charge and lepton number). So the actual laws
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place in Comins’s (1993) book, What If the Moon Didn’t Exist: Voyages
to Earths That Might Have Been. An astronomer at the University of
Maine, Comins devotes one chapter to explaining what the Earth would
have been like had the Moon not existed (the Earth’s rotation would have
been much faster without the Moon’s gravitational tug), another to ex-
plaining what the Earth would have been like had it been tilted like
Uranus, another to what the Earth would have been like had the Sun
been more massive, and so forth. Cumins takes (what we believe to be)
the laws of nature and extrapolates from them to the conditions that
would have existed under these various counterfactual circumstances.
Apparently, laws have greater invariance than accidents under coun-
terfactual perturbations. Compare Reichenbach’s favorite accidental gen-
eralization, that all solid gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile (Rei-
chenbach 1954, 10), to the law (supposing it to be one) that all solid cubes
of uranium-235 are smaller than one cubic mile (in view of the laws
governing nuclear chain-reactions). Had Bill Gates wanted to build a large
gold cube, then (I dare say) there would have been a gold cube exceeding
of nature (which entail the electron’s stability) might not still have held, had there been
a less massive lepton with one unit of negative electric charge. The existence of such
a lepton species (call them ‘nuons’) is logically consistent with the laws of nature (‘all
electrons are . . . ’, ‘all protons are . . .’, etc.) unless one of the laws stipulates that
all particles are either electrons or protons or . . . (a list that does not include nuons).
So our intuitive picture suggests the existence of such a ‘closure law’. Intuitively, the
laws of nature determine what knobs exist to be turned, and since the natural laws
make no provision for nuons, there is no knob for adjusting the number of nuons in
the universe’s history and thereby undermining the electron’s stability. Here is another
example along the same lines. Suppose it is a natural law that whenever a muon decays,
it turns into an electron and an electron-type neutrino. But ‘every decaying muon turns
into an electron and a electron-type neutrino’ (call this generalization ‘L’) is logically
consistent with every muon-decay event having (say) a 20% chance of yielding an
electron and a muon-type neutrino (and an 80% chance of yielding an electron and
an electron-type neutrino). With these probabilities holding, L could still hold, although
it would be an accident, analogous to a coin that is biased 80% in favor of heads
coincidentally landing heads each time it is tossed. Indeed, had these probabilities
obtained, L would probably not still have held; the string of heads would probably
break. Yet since these probabilities are logically consistent with L, we seem to have
here a counterfactual supposition with which the laws are logically consistent but under
which the laws would not all still have held. Once again, however, the intuition is that
the laws would still have held under any counterfactual antecedent that posits some
distribution of the properties governed by the laws. The counterfactual antecedent
should not posit a new kind of property-instance for which the laws leave no room,
such as a particle’s being a nuon or a statistical property (e.g., a muon decay’s having
a 20% chance of yielding an electron and a muon-type neutrino) where the relevant
laws are deterministic. There are no knobs for adjusting the distribution of properties
such as these. The laws of nature must include many closure laws—not only ‘there are
no nuons’, but also ‘no muon decay has a chance of yielding anything but an electron
and an electron-type neutrino’ (see Lange 2000, 284–285).
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a cubic mile. But even if Bill Gates had wanted to build a large cube of
uranium-235, all U-235 cubes would still have been smaller than a cubic
mile.6 Indeed, the laws are also invariant under nested counterfactual
suppositions. For example, even if Bill Gates had had access to 23rd-
century technology, he would have failed to build a large U-235 cube,
had he wanted to build one.7 The laws would still have been true, had p
been the case, for any p that is ‘nomically possible’ (i.e., logically consistent
with all of the laws), and likewise the laws are invariant under nested
counterfactual suppositions each of which expresses a nomic possibility.
But for each accident m, there is some such p under which it is not the
case that m would still have held. I shall term this idea ‘Nomic Preser-
vation’ (NP):
NP. For any m that is not a logical necessity (understood broadly so
as to include necessities that are conceptual, mathematical, etc.), it
is a law that m if and only if for any counterfactual suppositions q,
r, and so on, the subjunctive conditionals [‘had q been theq r m
case, then m would (still) have been the case’], ( ), andr r q r m
so on, are all true as long as q is nomically possible (i.e., logically
consistent with every m where it is a law that m), r is nomically
possible, and so on.
(I shall reserve lowercase letters for sentences purporting to state facts
that are governed by laws but not facts about what’s doing the governing.
So ‘q’ may stand for ‘all emeralds are green’ or ‘all solid gold cubes are
smaller than a cubic mile’ but not for ‘it is a law that all emeralds are
green’ or ‘it is an accident that all solid gold cubes are smaller than a
cubic mile’.) Principles roughly like NP have been defended by Chisholm
(1946), Strawson (1952), Mackie (1962), Pollock (1976), Jackson (1977),
Goodman (1983), Bennett (1984), Horwich (1987), Carroll (1994), and
many others.8
6. OK, even Bill Gates could not afford a cubic mile of gold. But he could afford a
cubic meter of gold—or a cubic mile of good-quality Timothy hay. But set these details
aside for the sake of a vivid example.
7. The nested counterfactual is not logically equivalent top r (q r r) (p&q) r
. For example, suppose we run a race, I try hard and win, and I boast that I wouldr)
always win if I tried: had you won, then had I tried, I would have won. This nested
counterfactual is plainly not logically equivalent to the false ‘had you won the race
and I tried, then I would have won’.
8. In stating NP, I ignore any complications that might result from distinguishing laws
of nature from contingent logical consequences of the laws that are not themselves
laws. That is, in considering counterfactual suppositions that are logically consistent
with every m where it is a law that m, I presume that m is a law if m is contingent
and follows logically from , where it is a law that h, it is a law that j,. . .h & j & & k
. . . and it is a law that k.
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Of course, the truth-values of counterfactual conditionals are notori-
ously context-sensitive. For example, in a conversational context where
we are bemoaning the paucity of quality pitching in the Major Leagues
today, the counterfactual ‘had Hank Aaron been playing today, he would
have hit 60 home runs in a season’ expresses a truth, whereas this coun-
terfactual conditional expresses a falsehood in a context where other facts
(such as Aaron’s date of birth) are also salient, and accordingly a truth
is expressed by ‘had Hammerin’ Hank been playing today, he would still
have managed to slug 10 homers in a season, despite being in his 70s’. I
presume that the laws of nature are the same in all conversational contexts.
Since NP purports to capture the logical relation between laws and coun-
terfactuals, and logic is not context-sensitive, I understand NP as asserting
that if m is a law, then and so forth are true in all conversationalq r m
contexts.9
NP permits there to be some nomically possible counterfactual sup-
positions q under which a given accident is invariant. Admittedly, all gold
cubes would still have been smaller than a cubic mile even if I had worn
a different shirt today. NP insists only that there be some nomically pos-
sible counterfactual supposition q under which the gold-cube generali-
zation would not still have held. Plainly, there is at least one such sup-
position: Had there been a solid gold cube larger than a cubic mile! Of
course, this q can be used with NP to show that Reichenbach’s gener-
alization does not state a law only because this q is nomically possible—
that is, only because Reichenbach’s generalization does not state a law!
This example highlights the circularity that threatens if we use the
notion of consistency with the laws to delimit the range of counterfactual
perturbations under which a fact must be invariant in order for it to
qualify as a law. We would then be using the laws to pick out the range
of counterfactual suppositions that, in turn, are used to pick out the laws.
To understand what laws of nature are, we need a means of distinguishing
the laws from the accidents that does not presuppose that this distinction
has already somehow been drawn.
9. The context-sensitivity of counterfactual conditionals is fully recognized by advo-
cates of principles like NP. In Lange 2000 and Lange 2007, I give a fuller account of
the way that principles like NP must be crafted to respect the context-sensitivity of
counterfactuals. Here I omit these details (since they would not affect my arguments)
as well as my defense of NP against the suspicion that there are at least some con-
versational contexts in which a law fails to be invariant under a counterfactual sup-
position that is logically consistent with all of the laws. Seelau et al. (1995, 66) offer
a psychological perspective on the way that, despite context-sensitivity, “counterfactual
thoughts are restricted to those that are plausible given the natural laws operating in
the world.”
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A solution to this problem can be found.10 The problem arose from
NP’s invoking a range of counterfactual suppositions (namely, every nom-
ically possible q) that has been designed expressly to suit the laws. What
if we extend the same courtesy to a set containing accidents, allowing it
to pick out a range of counterfactual suppositions especially convenient
to itself: those suppositions that are logically consistent with that set?
Take, for example, a logically closed set of truths m (i.e., a set containing
every logical consequence m of its members) that includes the fact that
all gold cubes are smaller than a cubic mile. The set’s members would
not all still have been true had Bill Gates wanted to build a large gold
cube. So for the set’s members all to be invariant under every counter-
factual supposition that is logically consistent with them (taken all to-
gether), the set must contain the fact that Bill Gates never wants to build
a large gold cube; the counterfactual supposition that he wants to do so
is then logically inconsistent with a member of the set. However, presum-
ably had Melinda Gates (Bill’s wife) wanted a large gold cube, then Bill
would have wanted one built. So having included the fact that Bill Gates
never wants to build a large gold cube, the set must also include the fact
that Melinda Gates never wants one, in order for all of the set’s members
still to have been true under any counterfactual supposition with which
the set is logically consistent.
Such a set must be very inclusive. Suppose, for example, that the set
omits the accident that all of the apples on my tree are ripe. Here is a
counterfactual supposition that is logically consistent with the set: had
either some gold cube exceeded one cubic mile or some apple on my tree
not been ripe. Under this counterfactual supposition, there is no reason
why the generalization about gold cubes (which is in the set) should take
priority in every conversational context over the apple generalization
(which we have supposed not to be in the set). So it is not the case that
the gold-cube generalization is preserved (in every conversational context)
under this counterfactual supposition. Hence, the set must also include
the apple generalization if the set is to be invariant under every counter-
factual supposition that is logically consistent with it. The upshot is that
if a logically closed set of truths includes an accident, then it must include
every accident if it is to be invariant under every counterfactual suppo-
sition that is logically consistent with it.
But according to NP, the set of laws possesses exactly this kind of
invariance. We can now specify (without circularity) the laws’ distinctive
relation to counterfactuals. Take a logically closed set G of truths that is
10. Lange (2000) contains more elaborate argument for the following account.
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neither the empty set nor the set of all truths m.11 Consider those coun-
terfactual suppositions with which G is logically consistent. Call the set
‘stable’ exactly when the set’s members would all still have held, under
every such counterfactual supposition (whatever the context)—indeed, no
matter how many such suppositions are nested. More precisely,
G is ‘stable’ exactly when for any member m of G and any claims q,
r, s, . . . , each of which is logically consistent with G (e.g., G ∪
is logically consistent), the subjunctive conditionals (which are{q}
counterfactuals if q, r, s, . . . , are false)
,q r m
,r r (q r m)
, and so on,s r (r r (q r m))
are true in any context.
Then m is a law exactly when m is not a logical necessity and belongs to
a set that is stable.12
Since ‘stability’ is not defined in terms of law (but rather allows each
set to pick out for itself the range of counterfactual suppositions under
which its invariance is to be assessed), we have here a noncircular way
of drawing a sharp distinction between laws and accidents. On this view,
what makes the laws special, as far as their range of invariance is con-
cerned, is that they form a stable set: collectively, taken as a set, the laws
are as resilient as they could logically possibly be. All of the laws would
still have held under every counterfactual supposition under which they
could all still have held—every supposition with which they are collectively
logically consistent. No set containing an accident can make that boast
(except for the set of all truths m, for which the boast is trivial: there are
no counterfactual suppositions p with which all such truths together are
logically consistent). A stable set is maximally resilient under counterfac-
11. Had I not excluded these two sets, then they would have trivially qualified as
‘stable’ by the upcoming definition (if the widely accepted principle of counterfactual
reasoning known as ‘Centering’ holds). I want to focus on nontrivial stability, since
belonging to a nontrivially stable set is (I argue) associated with being a law and
possessing necessity of some variety.
12. Even if there is more than one stable set, it suffices for m to belong to at least one
stable set. In Lange 2000, I show that for any two stable sets, one must be a proper
subset of the other. The laws may form a hierarchy, as in Newtonian physics, where
the laws of motion form a more exclusive stratum of law, and the force laws join the
laws of motion in forming a more inclusive stratum. (Classically, had the electromag-
netic force been stronger, the second law of motion would still have held. Classical
physicists used the second law of motion to investigate what would have happened
had various hypothetical force laws held. See, e.g., Airy 1830.)
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tual perturbations; it has as much invariance under counterfactual sup-
positions as it could logically possibly have.
Here, it seems, we have identified what it is about the laws in virtue of
which they possess a certain kind of necessity despite being contingent
truths. Intuitively, ‘necessity’ is an especially strong sort of persistence
under counterfactual perturbations. But not all facts that would still have
held, under even a wide range of counterfactual perturbations, qualify as
‘necessary’. Possessing some variety of ‘necessity’ is supposed to be qual-
itatively different from merely being invariant under a wide range of coun-
terfactual suppositions. Because the set of laws is maximally resilient—
as resilient as it could logically possibly be—there is a species of necessity
that all and only its members possess. No variety of necessity is possessed
by an accident, even by one that would still have held under many coun-
terfactual suppositions.
The laws’ stability thus accounts not only for the sharp distinction
between laws and accidents, but also for the laws’ necessity. (Presumably,
the laws’ necessity is, in turn, associated with the laws’ distinctive ex-
planatory power.) Let us now see how the laws’ stability bears upon the
possibility of (2)’s holding as a law for the universe’s first seconds1010
and (3)’s holding as a law thereafter.
5. Why the Laws Are Immutable. The above definition of ‘stability’ took
a stable set as consisting exclusively of truths. But as we saw earlier, this
stipulation begs the question against the laws’ mutability if we take the
laws to form a stable set. Accordingly, let us try to be more accommo-
dating to the possibility of temporary laws by defining ‘stability for a
given period of time’ and then identifying the laws during some period
with the members of a set that is stable for that period. Take a logically
closed set G of claims m, where each m is ‘true of that period’ (as I defined
this notion earlier) and where G is neither the empty set nor the set of all
claims m that are true of that period. Now call such a set ‘stable for that
period’ exactly when its members exhibit the invariance under counter-
factual suppositions that in the previous section we identified as distin-
guishing laws from accidents—that is, exactly when all of the conditionals
demanded by the definition of “stability” are true in any context. Does
a connection between lawhood during some period and stability for that
period permit the laws to be different in different periods?
(It may well strike you that once we have allowed m’s that are not true,
but merely true of the given period, to be eligible for membership in a
set that is stable for that period, then we should also drop the requirement
that the members of such a set be invariant under all of these counter-
factual suppositions in order for the set to qualify as stable for that period.
Rather, we should restrict the counterfactual suppositions to those that
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pertain exclusively to the given period. Shortly, I will entertain this pro-
posal for lowering the bar further.)
Suppose that (2) is a law when the universe is no more than 1010
seconds old. Then the counterfactual conditional (4) must be true; (4)’s
truth is part of what makes a certain set containing (2) qualify as stable
for that period.13 Suppose that seconds after the Big Bang, (3) re-1010
places (2) as a law. Hence, the counterfactual conditional (5) must be true;
(5)’s truth is part of what makes a certain set containing (3) qualify as
stable for the period when the universe is more than 1010 seconds old.
However, here is another counterfactual whose truth is required in order
for that set containing (2) to count as stable for the pre- -second1010
period:
(6) Had two electrons been at rest and exactly r centimeters apart for at
least r/c seconds at some moment when the universe is more than
1010 seconds old, then any such electrons would have experienced
at that moment a mutual electrostatic repulsion of F dynes.
After all, (6)’s counterfactual antecedent q is (I presume) also logically
consistent with every member m of the set containing (2) that is stable
for the earlier period. But (5) and (6) cannot both be true!14
We have here an argument that the laws cannot change, since the coun-
terfactuals required for (2)’s lawhood during the earlier period conflict
with the counterfactuals required for (3)’s lawhood during the later period.
This argument is not vulnerable to the two objections lodged against the
reductio considered in section 3. By dealing with counterfactuals, the above
argument permits (2) and (3) to be uninstantiated, voiding the first ob-
jection. And the above argument does not begin by presupposing that m
is a law during a given period only if m is true simpliciter; in order for
m to be eligible for membership in a set that is stable ‘for that period’,
m need merely be true ‘of that period’. Nevertheless, even after making
all of these accommodations to leave room for the laws to change, the
above argument shows that the laws in a given period must be laws forever.
This conclusion results not from the requirement that such a law be ‘true
13. I assume throughout that (4)’s antecedent q is logically consistent with the relevant
stable set, and likewise in my other examples.
14. You may be tempted to say that under the supposition that the laws change, (5)
is true throughout the earlier period and (6) is true thereafter, since the laws supporting
them are laws during different periods. But it is no more possible for (5) (or [6]) to be
true at one time and false at another than it is for ‘At 6 a.m. on June 21, 2005, Smith
is 6 feet tall’ to be so. Of course, the counterfactual ‘Had the match now been struck,
it would have lit’ might be true when uttered at one moment and false when uttered
at another (say, before and after the match was moistened). But unlike the antecedent
of the match counterfactual, the antecedents of (5) and (6) contain no indexical.
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of that period’. Rather, the laws’ immutability follows from their ‘law-
likeness’ as elaborated in terms of their stability (at least for that period).15
We are now better positioned to recognize how (1)’s being a law at all
times (an eternal but time-dependent law) would differ from (2)’s and
(3)’s each being laws at different times (temporary laws). (Recall that
some physicists have recently floated the theory that new laws can kick
in at a later moment and that these ‘newly created laws did not exist at
the beginning as laws’. Such remarks seem intended to distinguish the
theory under consideration from a theory with eternal but time-dependent
laws.) If the laws must form a stable set, then for (1) to be a law at all
times, (4) and (5) must be true, but (6) does not need to be true, so there
is no contradiction. In contrast, if (2) is a law during the earlier period
in the universe’s history and the laws of that period must form a set that
is stable for that period, then (4) and (6) must be true, which conflicts
with the counterfactuals required for (3) to be a law during the later
period. In short, if (2) is a law in the earlier period but (3) is not, then
various counterfactuals must hold that do not reflect (3)—and thereby
differ from the counterfactuals that must hold if (1) is always a law.
There is another way to argue for the laws’ immutability by appealing
to the connection between lawhood during a period and stability for that
period. Suppose m is a member of G, a set that is stable simpliciter, and
q, r, s, . . . , are each logically consistent with G. Then ,q r m q r
, , , and so on, are all true.(r r m) q r (s r m) q r (r r (s r m))
So in the closest q-world, m is true and these conditionals hold: r r
, , , and so on. And that’s just what’s needed form s r m r r (s r m)
G to be stable simpliciter in the closest q-world.
If q is false, then this argument shows that the laws would still have
been laws, had q been the case—taking the members of a set that is stable
simpliciter to be laws, as we discussed in the previous section. We thereby
save a powerful intuition: that had Jones missed his bus to work this
morning, then the actual laws of nature would still have been laws—and
so Jones would not have gotten to work on time had Jones (having missed
his bus) simply clicked his heels and made a wish to get to work. (That
was a nested counterfactual that just went by.)
Now let us run the same sort of argument, but this time let us begin
by supposing not that G is stable simpliciter, but merely that G is stable
15. I could have argued instead that if (2) is a law in a given period, then since (2)
must belong to a set that is stable for that period, the subjunctive conditional ‘were
squares four-sided, then (2)’ is true, and so (since squares actually are four-sided) (2)
is true—not merely true of that period. But (unlike the argument that I just gave in
the main text) this argument fails to show that (2) is a law forever, though it does
preclude (3)’s being an instantiated law during some period.
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for a given period. Suppose also that q is true, so the actual world is the
closest q-world. Then by the above argument, G is stable simpliciter, not
merely for a given period. (For example, that q is true and the subjunctive
conditional is true entails that m is true simpliciter, not merelyq r m
true of the given period.) So G’s members are laws forever, not merely
during the given period. The laws are immutable.
By this argument, if G consists of all of the laws during a given period,
then G’s members are laws forever. This reasoning does not merely require
all of G’s members to be laws during a later period. It also prohibits some
other claim m that is logically consistent with each of G’s members, but
not a law during the given period, from being a law (along with G’s
members) during a later period—coinciding with the advent of new ‘gen-
erations’ of particles. If set S (containing m) contains all and only the
laws during a later period, then by the argument that we have just re-
hearsed, S’s members (including m) must also have been laws during the
earlier period.
It might well be objected that despite lowering the bar from stability
simpliciter to stability for a given period, I have not been sufficiently
hospitable to the possibility of the laws’ changing. It turned out that for
G to be stable for a given period, the very same conditionals must be true
as for G to be stable simpliciter. As we have just seen, this requirement
demands that the laws during a given period be laws forever—even though
I did not begin by stipulating that the laws during a given period must
be true simpliciter, merely that they must be true of that period. Accord-
ingly, it might be suggested (as I foreshadowed near the start of this
section) that we should relax the requirements that a set G (of claims true
of a given period) must satisfy to qualify as ‘stable for that period’. Let
us now say that the only subjunctive conditionals ,q r m q r (r r
, . . . that must be true (in any context) are those where q, r, . . . eachm)
concerns exclusively the given period and where m, a logical consequence
of G, concerns exclusively the given period. (We might say that q concerns
exclusively the given period—say, when the universe is no more than
seconds old—if and only if there is no possible world where q is1010
false but q is ‘true of the given period’. In other words, q concerns ex-
clusively a given period exactly when, necessarily, q is true if the universe’s
history during that period is logically consistent with q.) If lawhood during
a given period is connected to this relaxed sense of stability for that period,
then—it might be suggested—(2)’s lawhood for the period when the uni-
verse is no more than seconds old does not demand that (6) be true,1010
merely that (4) be true. Hence, the earlier argument for the laws’ im-
mutability is stopped.
However, even if there is a well defined sense of q’s concerning exclu-
sively a given period, as in (4)’s antecedent exclusively concerning the
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period when the universe is no more than seconds old, what is the1010
period during which (2) is a law? It is supposed to be the period when
the universe is no more than 1010 seconds old. But let us suppose that
this is also exactly the period when the universe’s temperature is not below
K. (For the sake of argument, I assume that it is an accident153 # 10
that the temperature is below K exactly when the universe is153 # 10
older than seconds.) So if (2)’s lawhood during this period is con-1010
nected to (2)’s belonging to a set that is stable for that period (in the
above, relaxed sense), then which counterfactual’s truth does (2)’s law-
hood demand, (7)’s or (8)’s?
(7) Had two electrons been at rest and exactly r centimeters apart for at
least r/c seconds at some moment when the universe is no more than
seconds old and is below K, then any such electrons10 1510 3 # 10
would have experienced at that moment a mutual electrostatic re-
pulsion of F dynes.
(8) Had two electrons been at rest and exactly r centimeters apart for at
least r/c seconds at some moment when the universe is not below
K and is more than seconds old, then any such electrons15 103 # 10 10
would have experienced at that moment a mutual electrostatic re-
pulsion of F dynes.
There is no answer until there is a privileged way of picking out the period
during which (2) is supposedly a law. But for there to be such a privileged
way, something must privilege it. However, the obvious candidate is a law.
Perhaps, for example, (2)’s lawhood is set to expire when the universe’s age
exceeds seconds, and this moment just happens to be when the uni-1010
verse’s temperature falls below K. But in that case, (1) is the153 # 10
genuine law; the laws never really change; (2) was never a genuine law.16
Here is another way to put the same point. Suppose we specify the
period during which (2) is supposed to be a law as the period before the
universe’s age exceeds seconds. In other words, suppose that coun-1010
terfactuals like (7) are true whereas those like (8) are false, so that (2)
belongs to a set that is ‘stable for the period before the universe’s age
exceeds seconds’ (in the above, relaxed sense)—and (3) likewise1010
belongs to a set that is (in the relaxed sense) stable for the period thereafter.
Then the counterfactuals whose truth makes these sets stable for those
periods follow from the counterfactuals whose truth makes a set con-
taining (1) stable simpliciter. So on this interpretation of the laws ‘chang-
ing’, (2)’s being a law during the pre- -second period and (3)’s being1010
16. Of course, since (1) is a law and logical consequences of laws are laws (see note
8), it is a law that (2) is true of the period before the universe turns 10 10 seconds old.
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a law thereafter adds nothing, as far as which subjunctive conditionals
hold is concerned, to (1)’s being a law forever. I suggest that the temporary
laws add nothing at all here. Once it is stipulated that the relevant period
is to be designated as the period before the universe’s age exceeds 1010
seconds, the laws ‘changing’ from (2) to (3) at the close of that period is
nothing but (1)’s being a law throughout the universe’s history. We have
here not temporary laws, but rather an eternal (albeit time-dependent) law.17
6. Consequences for Metaphysical Analyses of Law. We have found no
interesting sense in which the laws can change. I conclude that the laws
are immutable. From this result, what morals can we draw regarding what
it is to be a law of nature?
Consider first Lewis’s Humean ‘best system’ account of the laws as the
members of the deductive system of truths having the best combination
of simplicity and informativeness regarding the entire history of instan-
tiations of all properties of an elite sort: the natural, categorical, non-
haecceitistic properties possessed intrinsically by spatiotemporal points or
occupants thereof (Lewis 1973, 73; 1986; 1999). On Lewis’s account, the
laws are immutable, since the laws at each moment are fixed in the same
way by the same thing: the universe’s complete history of elite-property
instantiations.
However, Lewis’s account entails the laws’ immutability only because
17. I have just argued that if we try to have (3)’s lawhood set by law to kick in when
the universe’s age exceeds 10 10 seconds, then (1) is an eternal law and (3) is not a
temporary law. However, what if (3)’s lawhood is not predetermined to kick in, but
rather results from an indeterministic process? For example, suppose it is a law that
when the universe is exactly 10 10 seconds old, there is a 50% chance that (3) will
thenceforth be a law and a 50% chance that (2) will thenceforth be a law. (The statistical
law we have just posited would be a meta-law: a law governing other laws. See Lange
2007 for more on meta-laws.) If by chance (3) turns out thenceforth to be a law, then
it will apparently be a temporary law; before the universe is 10 10 seconds old, it is
not a law that (3) holds after the universe is 10 10 seconds old, since before the universe
is 10 10 seconds old, there is some chance that (2) holds and (3) does not after the
universe is 10 10 seconds old.
However, (3) cannot achieve temporary lawhood by this route if its temporary law-
hood would require its belonging to a set G that is stable (in the above, relaxed sense)
for the period after the universe’s age exceeds 10 10 seconds. Suppose that q exclusively
concerns the period after the universe is 10 10 seconds old, and although q is logically
consistent with (3) (and indeed, let us presume, with G), q is much more likely if (2)
is true of the given period than if (3) is true of that period. Then (at least in certain
contexts, where backtracking is permitted) had q obtained, then the indeterministic
process might well have had a different outcome and so (3) might well not have been
true of the given period. Therefore, (3) does not belong to a set that is stable (in the
relaxed sense) for the period after the universe is 10 10 seconds old and so is not a
temporary law.
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a certain parameter in the account has been set to ‘the universe’s entire
history’. That parameter could be set differently. For example, there is a
deductive system of truths having the best combination of simplicity and
informativeness regarding the elite-property instantiations during a given
period. I see no grounds on which Lewis’s account could object to deeming
the members of that system to be the laws during that period.
For instance, Lewis’s account might be motivated roughly as follows
(following Beebee 2000, 547):
You: Describe the universe please, Lord.
God: I’m so glad you asked. Right now, there’s a particle in state
W1 and another particle in state W2 and I’ll get to the other particles
in a moment, but in exactly 150 million years and 3 seconds, there
will be a particle in state W3 and another particle in state W4 and . . .
You (checking watch): Lord, I have to hold office hours in a few
minutes.
God: All right, I’ll cater to your schedule by describing the universe
in the manner that is as brief and informative as it is possible si-
multaneously to be. This is just to tell you the laws of nature.
You: Do tell . . .
The trouble is that you might just as well have begun the conversation
by asking God to tell you about the goings on during some particular
period of the universe’s history. If what God ultimately tells you in the
first imaginary conversation merits being deemed ‘the natural laws’, then
by the same token, what God ultimately tells you in the second imaginary
conversation merits being deemed ‘the laws during the given period’.
The deductive system of truths having the best combination of sim-
plicity and informativeness regarding the actual universe’s first 1010 sec-
onds is presumably rather different from the best system for the 1010-
second period beginning when you reach the end of this sentence. Indeed,
if the laws of a given period are just the members of the best system for
that period, then the laws of March 2005 could in principle differ even
from the laws of March 10, 2005.
Such a result is avoided, and the laws are immutable, only if we restrict
our attention to the best system for the universe’s entire history. But the
rest of Lewis’s account does not demand this restriction; the notion of
‘the best system for the period ’ is perfectly coherent (if the notion[t , t ]1 2
of ‘the best system for the universe’s entire history’ is coherent). To fix
the relevant period as the universe’s entire history is artificial; it must be
inserted ‘by hand’. If the laws are immutable, then Lewis’s account con-
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tains an extra degree of freedom—a surplus adjustable parameter, which
must be set in an ad hoc manner.18
Non-Humean account of natural law would seem better able to explain
why the laws are immutable. For example, suppose that laws are contin-
gent relations (of a certain sort) among universals, as Armstrong (1983,
1997), among others, has maintained. Since universals stand outside of
the ebb and flow of particular events,19 so likewise (it seems) does their
standing in certain relations; those facts cannot change. Armstrong (1983,
79–80, 100) argues that since a property is identical in all of its instan-
tiations, any relation among universals must hold omnitemporally.
However, Armstrong recently says that although he used to argue that
no change in the contingent relations among universals is possible, he
now tends to think otherwise:
Why may it not be that F has the nomic relation [to] G at one time,
but later, since the connection is contingent, this relation lapses, per-
haps being succeeded by F’s being related to H? . . . It seems that
I have to allow that contingent relations between universals can
change. (1997, 257–258)
Armstrong’s thought seems to be that although a property remains iden-
tical in all of its instantiations, a universal need not stand in the same
nomic-necessitation relations at all times for it to be the selfsame universal.
If that is correct, then (since, I have argued, laws cannot change) laws
cannot be ‘nomic necessitation’ relations among universals.
I am inclined to think that the analysis of laws in terms of contingent
‘nomic necessitation’ relations among universals ultimately fails to specify
whether or not the laws can change. The notion of a nomic necessitation
relation is left underdescribed. Of course, the account could be made
simply to stipulate that the nomic necessitation relations holding among
18. Of course, my argument that the laws must be immutable depended crucially on
certain views of the laws’ relation to counterfactuals (notably NP and the laws’ stability)
that Lewis famously rejects. So although my initial aim was first to figure out whether
or not the laws must be immutable, and only then to test various proposed philosophical
analyses of law by examining how well they explain why this is so, my argument that
the laws must be immutable ended up not proceeding from neutral ground, but rather
begged the question against Lewis’s account. Neutral ground is hard to find hereabouts.
Nevertheless, I have identified an adjustable parameter in Lewis’s account; although
Lewis has adjusted it so that his account entails that the laws must be immutable, their
immutability is dispensable rather than integral to the account (in the absence of some
further motivation—perhaps deriving from the laws’ systematizing function—for set-
ting the parameter as Lewis does).
19. Although, Armstrong says, a universal cannot exist uninstantiated (as came up in
note 4).
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universals (such as F-ness nomically necessitating G-ness) are such as to
support exactly the counterfactuals that are required for the corresponding
set of truths (containing ‘all Fs are G’) to qualify as stable. But while this
stipulation would enable the analysis of law to entail the laws’ immuta-
bility, this stipulation would strike me as building into the account pre-
cisely what the account needs to explain.20 Rather than getting the right
answer by some ad hoc fine tuning added loosely to the core proposal,
the account should offer an independent picture of what it is for universals
to stand in relations of nomic necessitation, and from this picture, the
laws’ immutability should follow naturally and inevitably.21
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